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Abstract:   
This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on the number 
and size of firms in the formal and informal sectors, as well as on relative wages, relative 
size of the two sectors and overall unemployment. We show that entry costs in the 
formal sector tend to make informal firms smaller and more numerous than informal 
firms, i.e., such costs render the informal sector relatively more competitive. 
Furthermore, it is possible to reduce informality without increasing unemployment or 
reducing workers’ wage by reducing entry costs in the formal sector rather than reducing 
labor market regulations. We also highlight a number of externalities stemming from 
labor and product market imperfections, allowing the size of those distortions to differ 
across sectors. We show that, while the so-called overhiring externality takes place in 
both sectors, this translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector. 
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1 Introduction
Informal activities are pervasive in both developed and developing economies. According to
Schneider and Enste (2000) estimates, the size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP
ranges from 25 to 60% in Latin America, from 13 to 50% in Asia, and it is around 15% among
OECD countries, reaching 30% in some European countries. Informal firms differ from formal
ones in a number of measurable characteristics, and there is a growing literature trying to
understand the causes of informality and its differences from formal businesses. Product and
labor market regulation are the usual suspects, since they affect the cost of complying to taxes
and regulations for a formal firm.
On average, informal firms tend to invest less, to be less productive, to pay lower wages and
to hire less skilled workers. Moreover, firms in the informal sector are generally smaller and more
numerous compared to those in the formal sector.1 As a result they are prone to enjoy less market
power in the product market. All in all, the informal sector is likely to be more competitive
than the formal one. As a matter of fact, the informal sector is usually modeled in the literature
as a perfectly competitive one, while firms are assumed to enjoy market power in the formal
sector. An important question not yet explored in the literature is precisely what affects the
relative degree of competition in the two sectors, and its impact on firms’ behavior in the labor
market. This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations (hereafter PMR
and LMR, respectively) on the number and size of firms in the formal and informal sectors, as
well as on relative wages, relative size of the two sectors and overall unemployment.
We build a model with two sectors, a formal and an informal one, where both sectors are
subject to imperfect competition in the product market and matching frictions in the labor mar-
ket. The two sectors face the same externalities, but are allowed to differ with respect to some
parameter values, such as entry costs, taxes paid, the bargaining power of their workers, pro-
ductivity, among others. Firm size, labor demand, wages, prices, unemployment and informality
size are endogenously determined. In particular, in our model economy firms in the informal
sector turn out to be indeed smaller and more numerous than their formal counterparts. As a
result, the formal sector is relatively less competitive. We then study the effects of changes in
PMR modeled as changes in entry costs in the formal sector, and of changes in LMR, proxied
by changes in workers’ bargaining power, on the main endogenous variables of the model. We
highlight some externalities related to product and labor market imperfections and study how
they affect unemployment and the division of employment between the two sectors.
We simulate the model so as to replicate some of the key characteristics of the Brazilian
1Please, refer to next section where the stylized facts for Brazil corroborates the features described here.
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economy. We chose Brazil as our benchmark case because it is a developing economy with a
large informal sector. Brazil’s informal sector employs around 40% of its labor force, while
the country’s unemployment rate ranged from 7% to 13% over the last decade. Moreover,
Brazil has relatively high barriers to entry in the product market (Djankov et al., 2002), while
labor legislations appear relatively moderate compared to some other Latin American countries
(Botero et al., 2004). In this perspective, it is interesting to examine how unemployment and
informality would react, had the government chosen a different mix between product and labor
market regulations, that is, lower barriers to entry and/or stricter labor regulations.
There is a recent and growing literature on unemployment and informality in developing
countries. Our analysis highlights distortions that had not yet been contemplated by previous
models as being shared by both formal and informal sectors. In sum, in our model: (i) there
are frictions in both formal and informal labor markets; (ii) job seekers are identical and can
find jobs in both sectors, that is, the labor market is not segmented; (iii) the number and size
of firms in each sector is endogenous, which renders market power also endogenous; (iv) wages
are set through bargaining betweenlarge firms and their workers, which generates externalities
in the two sectors.
It is worth highlighting that, with respect to the labor market, we consider two sources of
distortions. First, there are the standard congestion externalities linked to the matching process.
Second, there are distortions resulting from wage bargaining between firms and workers, which
may generate either over- or underhiring. These wage bargaining distortions were not considered
in previous literature on informality. The size of overhiring is related to workers bargaining
power and to the price elasticity of demand faced by firms. Since those two features are allowed
to differ across sectors, the size of the overhiring externality itself may vary across sectors. Our
numerical exercises indicate that overhiring takes place in the formal sector, which translates
into underhiring in the informal sector. This translates into a smaller relative size of the informal
sector compared to the case without overhiring.
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), a number of recent papers have studied the impact
of PMR and LMR on unemployment in economies with frictions in the labor market (e.g.
Delacroix, 2006, Ebell and Haefke, 2009, Felbermayr and Prat, 2010). Those studies, however,
do not consider the existence of an informal sector. Given that informality represents a large
share of the economies, it is important to understand the impacts of policies on the informal
sector as well. For instance, the relative size of the informal sector should be responsive to
changes in the costs involved into creating a new business, since many of such costs are avoided
by firms entering the informal sector. Indeed, Figure 1 below illustrates that, among Latin
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American countries, the informal sector tends to be larger in countries where barriers to entry
are stricter. Many developing countries tend to have relatively larger barriers to entry of new
businesses (see Djankov et al., 2002), which could be part of the explanation of informality being
more pervasive among those countries.
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Figure 1: Informality and PMR in developing countries
Zenou (2008) studies the impact of labor market policies on informality, and he models
the formal sector as subject to labor market frictions and presenting unemployment, while the
informal is taken as being competitive. Although it is generally acknowledged that one of the
advantages of the informal sector relies on the fact that finding a job is easier, there is at best
no appealing evidence that the informal labor market should be a fully competitive one. In
any case, this particular case can easily be embedded in a more general model incorporating
matching frictions in both formal and informal labor markets, as the one developed in this paper.
In Fugazza and Jacques (2003), there are search frictions in both sectors, but they are
still segmented. Workers are not allowed to seek for jobs in the formal and informal sectors
simultaneously, and they differ with respect to a ‘moral’ cost of working in the informal sector.
In the case of developing countries, there is evidence that the informal sector is a integral part
of the economy, rather than a residual sector in a segmented labor market. Based on the Latin
American experience, Maloney (2004) claims that the informal sector should be viewed as an
unregulated micro-entrepreneurial sector instead. In terms of the unemployed’s behavior, for
instance, job seekers in developing countries are likely to look simultaneously for formal and
informal jobs, either because they cannot afford to do otherwise, or because there is less social
stigma related to taking a job in the informal sector. In contrast, in more developed countries
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workers look for a job in the informal sector only after having failed to find one in the formal
sector.
In Satchi and Temple (2009) workers can be employed either in agriculture or in a man-
ufacturing sector. Agriculture is taken as being perfectly competitive while in manufacturing
there are formal firms subject to matching frictions, and informal self-employed workers who
seek formal jobs. Although there is no labor market segmentation, informality is still viewed as
a disadvantaged or residual sector in that paper.
Ulyssea (2009) assumes, as we do, that job seekers are likely to find both formal and informal
jobs, and that it takes time to find both kinds of jobs. Such assumptions on workers’ search
behavior seem consistent with the empirical evidence on the Brazilian labor market presented
in the next section, where it is shown that there is a relatively large degree of mobility between
formal and informal jobs. This also leads us to argue that job seekers probably accept both
types of jobs and that the formal and informal labor markets are not segmented for the workers.
Our model differs from Ulyssea’s in other aspects. In particular, Ulyssea (2009) focuses on
endogeneous differences in productivity between the two sectors while we take such differences
as given, in order to focus on endogeneous differences in the degree of competition between the
two sectors.
Alternatively, Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) and Albrecht et al. (2009) are interested in ex-
plaining the sorting of workers across sectors, and they assume that workers differ in their
productivity. We are aware of the empirical evidence suggesting differences in workers’ skills
and firms’ productivity in formal and informal sectors, but the aim of our paper is not to explain
these features. We focus, instead, on explaining differences in firms size and competitiveness
across sectors, as well as the impact of PMR and LMR on unemployment, the relative size of
informal and formal sector, and their relative wages.
A common assumption to all those previous models is that each firm is allowed to hire only
one worker. We depart from this assumption and let firms hire as many workers as they desire.
El Badaoui et al. (2010) develop, to our knowledge, the only alternative model in this literature
in which firm size is also an endogenous variable. Based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
they build a model with on-the-job search and wage posting (instead of wage bargaining) where
firms’ choice of wages determines their size. In our model, however, firms choose their size
directly and wages are a result of a bargaining process between large firms and their workers.
Additionally, firms size will ultimately have an effect on the number of firms in a sector, which,
in turn, impacts firms’ market power in the goods market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts for the Brazilian
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economy. The theoretical model is described in Section 3. The equilibrium is derived in section
4 while section 5 provides some quantitative exercises. Section 6 concludes. Technical details
are gathered in the appendix.
2 Stylized Facts
We use data from the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, or PME) con-
ducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) for the greater metropoli-
tan regions of Sa˜o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife.
The PME collects information on employment and earnings, as well as other observable charac-
teristics such as the workers’ years of schooling, age, gender, state of residence, sector of activity
and occupation.
In Brazil, all workers formally employed in the private sector are required to have a working
card (‘carteira de trabalho’), thus, by observing whether the individual has a valid working card
we are able to sort formal and informal workers.2 Among the self employed, it is also possible
to distinguish those who pay social contributions to those who do not. We then define informal
workers as those informally employed in the private sector and the self employed who do not pay
social contribution. As shown in Figure 2, from 2003 to 2010 the share of the informal sector
declined from around 40 to 35% in Brazil, while the unemployment rate also decreased from
around 12 to 7%.
PME interviews the same individual at different moments in time for a period of 16 months.
For each individual, four interviews are conducted over the first four months, then there is an
interval of eight months, and once again the same individual is interviewed for four consecutive
months. Thus the information is gathered in months t, t+1, t+2, t+3, t+12, t+13, t+14 and
t+15. We use the fourth (t+3) and eighth (t+15) interviews of each individual to compute the
transition frequencies across employment states. Table 1 below presents the transitions between
unemployment, formality and informality, where each line displays the state of origin and the col-
umn the destination state. The table depicts some interesting patterns. An unemployed worker
has virtually equal probability of being in either one of the three states one year later. Formal
workers have a probability of 87.4% of remaining formal, while only 71.7% of informal workers
remain informal after one year. Finally, informal workers become formal with a probability of
23.1%, whereas the reverse is trues with a frequency of only 9.3%.
2Notice that we also need the information of whether the individual works in the public sector, since public
servants do not hold a working card as well. This question was included in the PME questionnaire from 2002 on.
We then choose to use data starting in 2002. For data prior to 2002 it was not possible to sort informal workers
from those working in the public sector.
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Figure 2: Informality and unemployment in Brazil
State T \ State T+1 Unemployed Employed: Registered
Employed: 
Unregistered
Unemployed 35,8% 32,1% 32,1%
Employed: Registered 3,4% 87,4% 9,3%
Employed: Unregistered 5,3% 23,1% 71,7%
 
Total 6,6% 62,2% 31,2%
246 574                 
3 378                     
Jan 2003-Feb 2010
Estimation Sample Jan 2004-Feb 2010
Monthly Labor Survey (PME) - IBGE
Total Observations (Different Individuals)
Average Observations per Month
Overall Period
Source
Table 1: Transition probabilities
We have also computed the same transition matrix using two alternative subsamples.3 In
first one we restrict the sample to workers 23 and 65 years old, which corresponds to 155,002
observations. In the second subsample we consider only low-skill workers (those with lower than
high-school education), which amounts to 124,569 observations. In all cases, we get broadly the
same picture, with marginal differences. In particular, there are more marked differences in the
probabilities for an unemployed to find a formal or an informal job using those subsamples. In
the first subsample, among the unemployed at time t, 34.5% stay unemployed, 31.1% find a job
in the formal sector, while 34.4% become an informal worker at t+1. In the second subsample,
3The results are available upon request.
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the same percentages are 34.9%, 29.4 and 35.7% respectively.
As shown in Figure 3, formal sector wages are 45 to 55% higher than wages in the informal
sector. We know, however, that formal and informal sector workers differ in a number of
characteristics that affect wages. We then estimate the wage premium in the formal sector
after controlling for observable individual characteristics available in the data.4 Controlled wage
gap is indeed much smaller than the observed one but it is still considerable, ranging from 23
to 30%, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Wage Premium
With respect to firm size, while it is not possible to know the exact number of employees in
a firm, we are able to divide firm size into three categories: the first one corresponds to firms
with 2 to 5 employees, the second one with 6 to 10 employees, and the third with 11 employees
or more. Figure 4 presents the averages of these three categories for the informal and formal
sectors. Formal sector firms are clearly larger than informal ones.
3 The model
We consider an economy with imperfect competition in the good market and matching frictions in
the labor market, populated by a continuum of risk neutral workers whose measure is normalized
to unity. There are two sectors, formal (F ) and informal (I), each producing one of the two
consumption goods available in the economy.
4We run mincer regressions in cross section for each month, where wages are explained by a dummy for informal
workers, a dummy for each city, and the following worker’s characteristics: age, age square, education, education
square, and position in the household.
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Figure 4: Firm size in formal and informal sectors
3.1 The goods’ market
Households derive utility from consuming goods from both formal and informal sectors, and
their preferences are represented by the following utility function:
U =
[
α
1
σ
F C
σ−1
σ
F + α
1
σ
I C
σ−1
σ
I
] σ
σ−1
(1)
where CF and CI denote a household’s consumption of the good produced in the formal and in
the informal sectors, respectively, while σ stands for the elasticity of substitution between the
two goods. Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that αF = αI ≡ α, the optimal consumption
pattern of a household n with real income Yn is given by:
Cjn = αYn
(pj
P
)−σ
, for j ∈ {F, I}
where pj is the price index of sector j good, P is the composite price index, P =
(
α
∑
j=I,F
p1−σj
)1/(1−σ)
,
which we normalize to one without loss of generality. There is a continuum of identical consumers
in the interval [0, 1], hence aggregate consumption is:
Cj = αY
(pj
P
)−σ
, (2)
where Y ≡ ∫ 10 Yndn denotes aggregate income.
Firms in each sector are identical. In a symmetric equilibrium, they all produce an equal
share of the total demand for the sector, hence firms may be labelled only by the industry j they
belong to. We then have that Cj = Njyj , where yj denotes the production of a firm and Nj the
9
number or firms in sector j. Nj is fixed in the short run, while in the long run it responds to
changes in market profitability and is determined by a free entry condition.
Using equation (2) and the normalization of the aggregate price index, we have that:
pj =
(
Njyj
αY
)−1
σ
. (3)
In this way, as a result of Cournot competition among firms, the elasticity of demand faced by
a firm in sector j, σj , is positively related to the number of firms operating in that sector as
follows:
σj ≡ σj(Nj) = σNj . (4)
Thus, in this simple framework, we have that the number of firms, Nj , determines the level of
competition in sector j. Several alternative ways to model imperfect competition in the good
market can be found in the literature, e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Delacroix (2006),
Ebell and Haefke (2009), or Felbermayr and Prat (2010). Our main results would not change
substantially when using alternative specifications.
Goods’ production uses labor as sole input. Recent research on informality has highlighted
the fact that informal firms are less productive than formal ones. We allow for different produc-
tivity across sectors by defining production function as:
yj = Ajhj (5)
where Aj stands for a (sector-specific) productivity parameter and hj is the firm’s size, that
is, the number of workers employed. The size of firms will be endogenously determined in the
model. We will see that, in equilibrium, firms in the informal sector are smaller, which is in
accordance with the stylized fact described in section 2.
Combining demand function in equation (3) and the production function in (5), goods’
market is in equilibrium when:
NjAjhj = p
−σ
j αY. (6)
3.2 The labor market
Empirical evidence indicates that informal workers have on average lower educational attainment
levels (see, among others, Gong and Van Soest, 2002, Gong et al, 2004, and Maloney, 2004).
Since informality would therefore be more a concern for low than for high skill workers5, we
choose to focus on identical workers6 searching for a job in the formal and in the informal sector
5Notice that in the case of developing countries like Brazil, the majority of the population is unskilled.
6This is of course a simplification compared to the papers studying the sorting mechanism between the two
sectors (e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006, Albrecht et al., 2009), but our focus is not on explaining sorting patterns
across sectors.
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simultaneously when unemployed. Furthermore, we assume that both formal and informal
sectors are subject to matching frictions in the labor market and that they share the same pool
of unemployed workers. These two assumptions depart from other recent works that incorporate
search-matching frictions to study informality, which assume a segmented labor market and takes
the informal sector as a residual perfectly competitive sector.
In each sector, vacant jobs and unemployed workers are brought together in pairs by a
matching function Mj . It maps the number of matches in sector j, Mj , to the total number of
job seekers and vacancies in that sector:
Mj ≡Mj(u, vj) (7)
where u and vj correspond respectively to the mass of job seekers
7, which is the unemployment
rate in the economy, and to the mass of vacancies in the sector. The function Mj features
standard properties: it is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in both of its
arguments, it is linearly homogeneous, satisfies the Inada conditions and the boundary conditions
Mj(0, vj) =Mj(u, 0) = 0 for u, vj ≥ 0.
We allow the matching function to be different across sectors to be able to capture their
particularities. For instance, firms may rely on different methods to recruit their workers in the
two sectors, so that the efficiency of the two matching processes may differ somewhat. It is also
often argued that, compared to the formal sector, the informal sector is closer to a competitive
market where it takes less time to match. In such a case, the matching process would be more
efficient in the informal sector, resulting in a larger number of matches for the same level of
inputs in the matching function.
On average, a firm contacts a worker at rate Mj/vj while a job seeker meets a sector j
firm at rate Mj/u. Let θj ≡ vj/u be the labor market tightness. Linear homogeneity of the
matching function allows us to write those contact rates as Mj/vj ≡ mj(θj), with m′j(θj) < 0,
and Mj/u = θjmj(θj), which is an increasing function of θj . Thus vacancies are filled at rate
mj(θj) in sector j while workers exit unemployment at rate
∑
j=F,I
θjmj(θj).
A few remarks are in order. First, differences in job finding rates between the formal and
the informal sector can easily be captured with two matching functions having different scale
parameters. For instance, in the Cobb-Douglas case, MF = κFu
ηv1−ηF while MI = κIu
ηv1−ηI ,
with κI ≥ κF . Second, the assumption of search frictions in both sectors encompasses the
particular case of perfect competition in the informal labor market considered in several papers.
That would corresponds to the limit case where κI → ∞ in our framework, i.e. in a fully
7We assume job seekers are ‘truly’ unemployed. Alternatively, we could assume that they are in fact self-
employed, and that the self employed search for jobs.
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competitive labor market, where it takes no time to locate a job offer or to fill a vacancy. Finally,
if it took no time to locate a formal job (θFmF (θF )→∞), all workers would be employed in the
formal sector. Thus, matching frictions are an important reason for the existence of an informal
sector, and the underlying assumption for the existence of the two sectors is that the formal
sector is ‘sufficiently’ frictional.
Matches are dissolved at rate dj , due either to an exogeneous separation rate sj between
firms and workers or to the exit of firms from the market, which occurs with probability δj .
Hence, the sector-specific destruction rate is:
dj = δj + sj(1− δj) (8)
Workers can be either employed or unemployed so that:
LF + LI = 1− u (9)
where Lj = Njhj denotes employment in sector j, and u stands for unemployment. In steady-
state equilibrium, the mass of unemployed workers that find a job in a sector has to equal the
mass of workers that loose a job in that sector, that is:
djLj = θjmj(θj)u (10)
Equation (10) states that when a fraction dj of the jobs in sector j are destroyed, they are
compensated by an inflow θjm(θj)u of job seekers who are recruited in sector j.
3.3 Firms’ decisions
Following a growing body of the literature, we depart from the basic matching model by assuming
firms can hire more than one worker. This implies that firm size becomes an endogeneous variable
which responds to changes in firm’s expected profits. This feature of the model allows us to
analyze the determinants of the relative size of firms in the two sectors. In particular, firm size
depends on the elasticity of substitution σj , as we will show below, due to the assumption of
imperfect competition in the good market.
Firms choose the number of vacancies and its size so as to maximize expected profits, which
can be written as:
Vj(hj) = max
vj ,h
′
j
1
1 + r
[
pj (yj) yj (hj)− wj (hj)hj (1 + τj)− γjvj + (1− δj)Vj
(
h′j
)]
, (11)
where r is the interest rate, γj is the cost of a vacancy, τj represent taxes on labor costs,
and wj (hj) is the wage function resulting from the bargaining process, which will be derived
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in the next section. hj and h
′
j represent the number of workers in current and next periods,
respectively. The inverse demand function pj(yj) is given by equation (3), while the production
function yj (hj) is in equation (5). Notice that, in this setting, firms do not take prices as given
in the final goods market, as shown by the inverse demand function, and enjoy some bargaining
power in the labor market, given by the wage function.
The number of workers next period, h′j , is determined by the following transition function:
h′j = mj(θj)vj + (1− sj)hj , (12)
that is, next period’s employment is equal to the number of matches for the vacancies posted plus
the number of current workers that remain employed. Thus, firms advertise as many vacancies
as necessary in order to hire, in expected value, the desired number of workers next period,
taking into account the cost of a vacancy γj and the constraints on labor market flows given by
the transition function (12).
The optimal number of vacancies posted is such that the marginal contribution of a worker
to the firm’s expected profit is equal to the expected search cost, that is:
(1− δj)
∂Vj(h
′
j)
∂h′j
=
γj
mj(θj)
. (13)
From the profit function (11), the marginal contribution of a worker to the firm’s profit,
denoted the envelope condition, can be written as:
∂Vj (hj)
∂hj
=
1
1 + r
σj − 1
σj
pjAj −
(
wj(hj) +
∂wj (hj)
∂hj
hj
)
(1 + τj) + (1− δj) (1− sj)
∂Vj
(
h′j
)
∂h′j
 ,
(14)
where we have used the fact that
∂pj(yj)
∂yj
∂yj
∂hj
yj+pj
∂yj
∂hj
=
σj−1
σj
pjAj and that
∂h′j
∂hj
= 1−sj . The term
σj−1
σj
pjAj corresponds to marginal revenue to which the marginal costs
(
wj(hj) +
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj
)
×
(1 + τj) of expanding the labor force to hj should be substracted. Marginal costs differs from
wage since firms take into account the effect of an additional worker on the wages of previously
employed workers.
In steady state firms’ size is constant, that is, hj = h
′
j . Hence, from equation (13) we have
that:
∂Vj (hj)
∂hj
=
∂Vj
(
h
′
j
)
∂h
′
j
=
γj
mj (θj) (1− δj) . (15)
Substituting the optimal vacancies condition (13) into equation (14), and using the steady state
condition (15), we get that:
pj(hj) =
1
Aj
(
σj
σj − 1
)[(
wj(hj) +
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj
)
(1 + τj) +
γj(r + dj)
mj(θj)(1− δj)
]
(16)
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Equation (16) defines firms’ pricing behaviour in steady state, and can be interpreted as a
mark-up equation over total labor costs, inclusive of wage and search costs. Firms enjoy some
market power on the good market, but also on the labor market, due to the existence of search
frictions. In the absence of frictions, price pj would simply be equal to
1
Aj
(
σj
σj−1
)
wj . Here,
though, the marginal cost of labor also takes into account the existence of recruitment costs
and the impact of an additional worker on the wages of the infra-marginal workers,
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj .
The latter term is negative, as shown in next section. This means that employers exploit
decreasing marginal returns in order to reduce the wages of each infra marginal worker. For this
reason the term is usually denoted in the literature as the overemployment or overhiring effect.
Alternatively, equation (16) can be interpreted as a labor demand equation which relates the
firms’ optimal employment and wages choices.
Notice that using the steady-state condition that
∂Vj(hj)
∂hj
=
∂Vj
(
h
′
j
)
∂h
′
j
, the envelope condition
(14) can alternatively be written as:
∂Vj(hj)
∂hj
=
1
r + dj
[
Aj
σj − 1
σj
pj −
(
wj(hj) +
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj
)
(1 + τj)
]
, (17)
which will be useful for the derivation of the wage function.
3.4 Wage Bargaining
Let Ej and U denote respectively the asset values of a worker employed in sector j (j ∈ {F, I}) or
searching for a job. An unemployed worker enjoys a flow utility z, which may correspond to e.g.
a combination of home-production and/or flow utility from leisure enjoyed while unemployed.
He has a utility gain of (Ej − U) when he finds a job in sector j, which occurs with probability
θjm (θj). Thus, in steady state we have that:
rU = z + θFm(θF ) (EF − U) + θIm(θI) (EI − U) (18)
A worker employed in sector j, on his turn, receives a wage wj and incurs an utility loss of
U − Ej when the job is destroyed, which occurs at rate dj . We then have that:
rEj = wj + dj(U −Ej) (19)
which implies that the benefit of holding a job in sector j over continued search is equal to the
difference between the wage wj and the worker’s reservation product rU, that is:
Ej − U = wj − rU
r + dj
. (20)
Workers are not paid their full marginal product as in the standard neoclassical framework
due to a combination of costly search and matching frictions which give rise to rent sharing. Most
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of the papers which study informality incorporating search frictions assume that wages result
from Nash bargaining between one worker and one firm in the sector that experiences search
frictions. We assume alternatively that bargaining takes place between a firm and its multiple
workers, each worker being treated as the marginal worker. This is a good representation of
reality when firms cannot commit to long-term contracts and may renegotiate wages with each
worker at any time. This seems an adequate framework to represent a case like the Brazilian
one, where job turnover is extremely high (see Gonzaga, 2003).
Furthermore, this interesting alternative assumption has not been implemented yet in the
literature studying the composition of employment in terms of formal vs informal jobs. We
follow a growing body of the literature that has applied this assumption in studies not related to
informality. See, among others, Bertola and Caballero (1994), Stole and Zwiebel (1996), Smith
(1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Delacroix (2006), Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2008), Ebell
and Haefke (2009), Felbermayr and Prat (2010).
As it will become clear later, bargaining with multiple workers introduces some important dif-
ferences compared with the standard one-worker-per-firm framework, as under the neo-classical
framework where wages equal marginal product. In particular, this gives rise to an overhiring ex-
ternality according to which firms hire workers above the point where the marginal revenue from
hiring the marginal worker equals marginal cost, so as to reduce the wage of all inframarginal
workers.8
The bargain between firms and the marginal worker yields:
(1− βj) (Ej − U) = βj
1 + τj
∂Vj(hj)
∂hj
. (21)
where βj ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as workers’ bargaining power. Using equations (17), (20)
and (21), after some algebra it is possible to show that the wage wj is a solution to the following
differential equation:9
wj(hj) = (1− βj)rU + βj
[
Aj
1 + τj
σj − 1
σj
pj − ∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj
]
, (22)
which has the following solution:
wj(hj) = (1− βj)rU + βj σj − 1
σj − βj
Ajpj(hj)
1 + τj
. (23)
Equation (23) can be interpreted as the wage curve, which defines the wage as a weighted
average of workers’ reservation value rU and of firm’s marginal revenue, captured by the term
σj−1
σj−βj
pj(hj)Aj
1+τj
8Our framework is fairly general, as it always possible to compare the situation where overhiring is ruled out
to the case where it takes place. It is also possible to allow for overhiring in one sector only. This exercise is
deferred to section 5.
9See appendix for the derivation of equations (22) and (23).
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The relation between wages and employment is clear when one evaluates
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj . Combin-
ing equations (22) and (23) we get:
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj = − βj
σj − βj︸ ︷︷ ︸
overhiring
σj − 1
σj︸ ︷︷ ︸
market power
pj(hj)Aj
1 + τj
< 0 (24)
which implies that the bargained wage is a decreasing function of employment. It is noticeable
from equation (24), that the wage hinges on an overhiring and a market power term. This is
due to the fact that the firm’s marginal revenue decreases with the number of workers, since
the increased production from hiring an extra worker tends to reduce the price pj . This effect is
taken into account by the firms enjoying some market power. Given that each worker is treated
as the marginal worker, hiring one more worker reduces the wage by
∣∣∣∂wj(hj)∂hj ∣∣∣. This leads to the
so-called overhiring externality.
Notice that the overhiring effect differs across sectors, since they have different market and
bargaining powers. Namely, from equation (24), the overhiring externality increases with work-
ers’ bargaining power βj and decreases with competition σj . It vanishes when βj → 0 or σj →∞.
In such limit cases, workers are paid a constant wage: they get their reservation wage in the first
case, while the marginal product of a worker is constant under full competition in the second.
Such limit cases are more likely to apply to the informal sector, since workers’ bargaining power
is smaller in the informal sector while competition is more intense than in the formal sector.
We substitute the wage equation (23) and its derivative (24) into the mark-up equation (16)
to get:
pj =
1
Aj
σj − βj
σj − 1
[
rU(1 + τj) +
1
1− βj
γj(r + dj)
mj(θj)(1− δj)
]
, (25)
which establishes the optimal price set by the firm as a function exclusively of variables exogenous
to the firm’s decision.
Finally, we substitute price from equation (25) into the wage equation (23) to derive wages
also as a function of variables the firm takes as given when taking its decisions:
wj = rU +
βj
1− βj
γj(r + dj)
mj(θj)(1− δj)(1 + τj) (26)
Notice that combining equations (16) and (24) we get the equation that determines the optimal
employment choice:[
wj(hj)(1 + τj) +
γj(r + dj)
mj(θj)(1− δj)
]
σj − βj
σj
= Ajpj(hj)
σj − 1
σj
(27)
According to equation (27), firms set employment, and therefore wages, so as to equalize
marginal costs to marginal revenue. Marginal revenue, on the right hand side, includes a factor
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σj−1
σj
< 1, due to their market power in the good’s market. Marginal costs, on the left hand side
of the equation, consist of wages, taxes on labor and expected search costs. It is weighted by
an overhiring factor
σj−βj
σj
< 1, which establishes that they set hj above the efficient level where
benefit from hiring the marginal worker equals his cost. Firms are willing to do so because they
are aware that hiring more workers tends to depress wages paid for their entire workforce. A
similar externality is also highlighted in various settings with matching frictions. In our two-
sector setting, overhiring should be less important in the sector where workers’ bargaining power
βj is smaller or where the elasticity σj is larger. Typically, that should be the case in informal
sectors where there is a larger number of firms and where workers have lower bargaining power10
(see Camargo, 2003).
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibrium in the short-run
We are now ready to determine the short-run equilibrium where the number of firms in each
sector is constant. Given our previous assumptions, having a fixed number of competitors Nj
is equivalent to fixing the elasticity σj faced by each firm in industry j. Hence a short-run
equilibrium is defined for a given value of Nj for each industry, while prices pj , wages wj , firm
size hj and sectoral employment Lj = Njhj , aggregate unemployment u = 1 −
∑
j=I,F Lj ,
tightness θj and workers’ reservation value are endogeneously determined. In the simulations of
the model we do comparative statics analysis to investigate the impact of some of the parameters.
In particular, we highlight the impact of fiercer competition on all variables in the short run
by investigating the impact of changes in the degree of competition σj = σNj , captured by a
change in Nj .
Equations (25) and (26) establish optimal prices and wages as a function of labor market
tightness and workers’ reservation value. Using the wage bargaining equation (21) and the
expression that determines the optimal number of vacancies (13), workers’ reservation value
from equation (18) can be rewritten as a function of the labor market tightness, as in:
rU = z +
∑
j=F,I
1
1 + τj
βj
1− βj
γjθj
1− δj . (28)
10Notice that such an externality is here studied assuming that workers’outside options are fixed. Section 5
studies the impact of such a wage bargaining externality when workers’ outside options are endogenous. It is then
shown that overhiring in the formal sector may translate into underhiring in the informal sector. In any case,
there are reasons to think that the so-called overhiring externality implies a smaller relative size of the informal
sector.
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With equation (28), the equations for prices (25) and for wages (26) may also be written as
functions of sectoral tightness, as follows:11
pj (θj , θk) =
σj − βj
σj − 1
1
Aj
[
(1 + τj) z +
1 + τj
1 + τk
βk
1− βk
γkθk
1− δk +
r + dj + βjθjmj (θj)
(1− βj) (1− δj)
γj
mj (θj)
]
,
(29)
and wj (θj , θk) = z +
βj
1− βj
γj (r + dj + θjmj (θj))
(1− xj)mj (θj) (1 + τj) +
1
1 + τk
βk
1− βk
γkθk
1− δk (30)
for j, k ∈ {I;F} and k 6= j. It is worth noting that prices and wages in each sector j also depend
on the other sector’s variables, including labor market tightness θk. This is mainly a consequence
of our assumption that workers search employment in both sectors simultaneously, which implies
that workers’ reservation value depends on labor market conditions of both sectors as stated by
equation (28), while wages and prices are themselves functions of this reservation value.
We now have to determine labor market tightness in the two sectors (θ∗F , θ
∗
I ). They are
determined by the equilibrium conditions in the goods and in the labor markets as follows.
First, using equation (6) we get the employment ratio between the informal and formal sectors
that satisfy the goods’ market equilibrium. We denote it the product market equilibrium (PME)
condition:
L∗I
L∗F
=
AF
AI
[
pI (θ
∗
F , θ
∗
I )
pF
(
θ∗F , θ
∗
I
)]−σ , (31)
which defines implicitly the intersectoral allocation of labor as a function of relative prices and
relative productivity, an usual property.
Note that the ratio L∗I/L
∗
F is a function of tightness θ
∗
F and θ
∗
I due to the (positive) depen-
dence of prices pF and pI on these variables, as highlighted by equation (29). A rise in θ
∗
j , would
imply a rise in wages (see equation (26)), translating into a higher price. The quantity consumed
thus decreases, resulting in lower employment in the sector. However, as given by (31), the rela-
tive labor allocation L∗I/L
∗
F depends on relative (rather than absolute) prices. Since both prices
depend positively on θ∗F and θ
∗
I , the impact of a change in these variables on relative prices is
ambiguous. It depends on which price is more sensitive to changes in labor market tightness,
which is captured by a condition on price elasticities.12 The comparative statics properties of
this relationship is ambiguous as well, since it depends on which price is impacted the most by
a change in parameters in equation (31).13
11With some abuse of notation, we now write prices and wage as functions of labor market tightness: pj (θj , θk)
and wj (θj , θk).
12Differentiating (31) we get that the ratio L∗I/L
∗
F increases with θ
∗
I if and only if εpF /θI > εpI/θI . Similarly,
the ratio L∗I/L
∗
F decreases with θ
∗
F if and only if εpF /θF < εpI/θF . Nevertheless, such restrictions may not always
hold.
13We therefore study the comparative statics on the basis of numerical exercises, and we get monotonic responses
of
L∗I
L∗
F
to changes in the parameters considered. See section 5.
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Second, from equation (10) we derive the relative employment in the two sectors that is
compatible with equilibrium in the labor market. We get then the labor market equilibrium
(LME) condition:
L∗I
L∗F
=
dF
dI
θ∗ImI(θ
∗
I )
θ∗FmF (θ
∗
F )
. (32)
which defines the intersectoral allocation of labor as a function of sectoral tightness, efficiency
parameter of the matching processes and turnover rates. Hence, the LME condition imply that
the informal sector is relatively larger when its own labor market tightness θ∗I is higher and
when the formal sector’s tightness θ∗F is lower. Moreover, the formal sector is larger also when
its own destruction rate of jobs is lower and the informal sector’s one is higher.
Equalizing the PME and LME relationships (31) and (32), and making use of the price
equation (29), we determine a first relationship between θ∗F and θ
∗
I :
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dF
dI
θ∗ImI(θ
∗
I )
θ∗FmF (θ
∗
F )
=
AF
AI
[
pI (θ
∗
F , θ
∗
I )
pF
(
θ∗F , θ
∗
I
)]−σ (33)
Equation (33) establishes the sectoral tightness that satisfy the equilibrium conditions that
determine the intersectoral allocation of labor. We then denote it Intersectoral Allocation of
Labor curve (IALC).
A second relationship between the two sectoral tightnesses is obtained using the price equa-
tion (29) and the definition of the aggregate price index:
P ∗ = 1 = α
1
1−σ
[
pI(θ
∗
I , θ
∗
F )
1−σ + pF (θ∗I , θ
∗
F )
1−σ] 11−σ .
We get that:
1− αpI(θ∗I , θ∗F )1−σ = αpF (θ∗I , θ∗F )1−σ (34)
which defines a decreasing relationship between θ∗I and θ
∗
F . It will be labelled the Price Curve
(PC).
The IALC and PC relationships together determine the equilibrium levels of labor market tight-
ness in the two sectors, θ∗F and θ
∗
I , by means of a fixed point argument. The equilibrium is unique
provided the IALC relationship evolves monotonically with respect to θ∗I and θ
∗
F , as represented
in Figure 5. The numerical simulation in the next section checks this monotonicity, and Figure
13 depicts the corresponding equilibrium.
Once having determined equilibrium values for labor market tightness θ∗I and θ
∗
F , all other
variables of the model follow: prices p∗j ≡ pj(θ∗I , θ∗F ) and wages w∗j ≡ wj(θ∗I , θ∗F ) are determined
14As mentioned above, the relationship is not necessarily monotonous. We however check in our simulations
that this condition is satisfied.
19
6-
θF
θI
θ∗F
θ∗I
IALC
PC
Figure 5: Unique Equilibrium
as a function of tightness in equations (29) and (30). Workers’ reservation product rU∗ is also a
function of tightness as a result from (28). As for sectoral employment levels, the labor market
equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) imply:
L∗j =
[
1 +
dj
θ∗jm(θ
∗
j )
+
dj
dk
θ∗kmk(θ
∗
k)
θ∗jmj(θ
∗
j )
]−1
, for j, k ∈ {F, I}, and k 6= j (35)
u∗ = 1− L∗F − L∗I , (36)
and, by definition, v∗j = θ
∗
ju
∗ while h∗j = L
∗
j/Nj , where Nj can be treated as a parameter in the
short run, and will be endogenized in the longer run.
From equation (35), employment in a sector is an increasing function of its own tightness
and a decreasing function of the other sector’s tightness. The intuition is the following. If, for
instance, tightness θ∗j increases in a sector, workers will find jobs in that sector more easily,
thus increasing employment in that sector. Then, from (36), it turns out that unemployment
decreases when employment increases in formal or informal sectors.
Finally, in equilibrium total income equals total product, hence:
Y ∗ =
∑
j=I,F
Ajpj
(
θ∗j , θ
∗
k
)
Lj
(
θ∗j , θ
∗
k
)
. (37)
Formal and informal sectors are interdependent for basically two reasons : (i) in equilibrium,
demand for goods and therefore sectors’ relative size depend on relative prices, as it is clear from
equation (31); (ii) workers search for jobs in both sectors, as established by equation (18). As a
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result, a change in sector-specific parameters affects both sectors, as will be shown in the next
section through numerical exercises.15
4.2 Long-run general equilibrium
The next step is to determine the long run equilibrium in which the number of firms in each
industry endogenous. The timing of events is the following. At the beginning of a period firms
decide whether enter the market. If they enter they pay an entry cost, cj , on top of the cost of
posting vacancies in a number sufficient to recruit the desired amount of workers.16 Business is
then started and profits are received at the end of that period/begining of the next period.
Entry costs entail direct administrative costs as well as indirect costs due to administrative
delays. Several of the entry costs do not apply to the informal sector, such as, for instance, the
official registration to comply with legislation. Although it would be fair to say that barriers
to entry are essentially a problem in the formal sector, informal firms may still incur in entry
costs since it may take some time and resources to set up a business in this sector. It is then
reasonable to assume that 0 ≤ cI < cF .
In equilibrium, the free entry condition establishes that the costs of setting a business must
equal its profits, as in:
cj +
γjh
∗
j
mj(θ∗j )
=
1 + r
r + δj
pi∗j , for j ∈ {I, F}, (38)
where the second term in the left-hand side corresponds to the cost of posting vacancies to hire
the desired amount of labor h∗j , and pi
∗
j stands for profits, which is given by:
pi∗j = p
∗
jAjh
∗
j − w∗jh∗j (1 + τj)− γjv∗j (39)
= p∗jAjh
∗
j − w∗jh∗j (1 + τj)− γjsjh∗j/mj(θ∗j ).
In the previous section we have derived all short run variables as functions of labor market
tightness θ∗I and θ
∗
F , which are themselves parameterized by the number of firms operating in
each sector, NI and NF . Hence, in a long run equilibrium, all variables are defined as functions
of NI and NF and equation (38) closes the model .
Firms’ profit opportunities decline with the number of firms operating in the market N∗j
since with more firms there is more competition and lower markups. Under free entry, a rise in
15The case with identical sectors is studied in the appendix. In that case, the IALC curve becomes the 45o line,
and only the PC curve with θI = θF shifts as parameters change.
16Notice that in our setup, firms jump to their steady state size when they enter the market. This is a
consequence of our assumption of linearity of adjustment costs. See Bertola and Caballero (1994) for a model
with convex costs. See also Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) for an alternative framework where firms cannot hire
a large number of workers in each period.
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the left hand side of the free entry condition (38), for instance, due to an increase in entry costs
cj or in hiring costs
γjh
∗
j
mj(θ∗j )
must be compensated by an equal rise of the right hand side of (38),
i.e. higher profits, which is obtained by a smaller equilibrium number of firms.
5 Numerical simulations
5.1 Parametrization and calibration
We choose parameters with two criteria in mind: (i) they have to be realistic and coherent
with the values usually used in the literature, (ii) the values of endogeneous variables stemming
from the simulations have to be realistic and/or comparable with the values found in previous
studies. We choose the Brazilian economy to guide our parametrization. Brazil is a large
developing country with a sizeable informal sector, with the advantage of having high quality
micro data available, which has already been exploited in a number of empirical studies. Hence,
we have both access to data and to other studies that have worked on them.
Our reference period is a month and we use 2003 as reference year. The discount rate r
is set to 0.6434% which correspond to an annual rate of 8% as in Heckman and Page`s (2003).
All relevant variables and parameters are allowed to differ between the formal and the informal
sectors. Informal sector firms are assumed to be less productive than formal ones, and their pro-
ductivity is normalized to one. The productivity parameter in the formal sector is 2, capturing
a productivity differential of 100% between the two sectors, as used by other studies (see, for
instance, Ulyssea, 2009). In terms of our notation, we have then that AF = 2 and AI = 1.
In a recent study, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2009) estimate that the annual
exit rate for Brazilian firm ranges between 5% to 10%, and they indicate that exit rate is higher
among smaller firms. Since firms are on average smaller in the informal sector than in the formal
one, we use the lower bound of the interval to define firms’ exit rate in the formal sector and,
conversely, the upper bound to define firms’ exit rate in the informal sector. It follows that
the monthly values for the two parameters are set to δF = 0.0041 and δI = 0.0080 which is
consistent with the intuition that on average firms’ turnover is higher in the informal sector, i.e.
δF < δI . Labor turnover is higher in the informal sector dF < dI . We choose the parameters to
be equal to dF = 0.0221 and dI = 0.0102 which correspond to an annual rate of 13% and 30%
as in Heckman and Page`s (2003) and Ulyssea (2009). Finally, making use of equation (8), the
exogenous separation rates are set to sF = 0.0062 and sI = 0.0142 respectively.
The elasticity of the matching function is set to one half, as usual in the literature (Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001, Shimer, Rogerson and Wright, 2005) while the scale parameter of the
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Table 2: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Sector Formal/informal Description
Formal Informal
Aj 2 1 2 Productivity
δj 0.41% 0.80% 0.51 Firms exit rate
dj 1.02% 2.21% 0.46 Matches dissolution rate
γj 1.1 0.45 2.44 Cost of a vacancy
κj 0.0475 0.1 0.48 Matching function parameter
βj 0.45 0.15 3 Workers bargaining power
τj 30% 0 - Tax on labor costs
cj 2.5 0.5 5 Entry cost
General parameters
r 0.65% Discount rate
σ 2.05 Elasticity of substitution
α 0.5 Utility function parameter
z 0.05 Workers reservation value
matching function is set to target an unemployment rate of approximatively 12.5% as in the
data (See section 2). According to Camargo (2005) the bargaining power in the informal sector
is approximately 1/3 of that in the formal sector. Those parameters can then be set to βF = 0.45
and βI = 0.15, as in Ulyssea (2009). By definition, the labor tax rate is nil in the informal sector
and we set the formal tax rate equal to 30% which is consistent with the value reported in the
World Doing Business Indicators for social security contributions and payroll taxes.
Keeping in mind that firms in informal sectors face lower (if any) entry and flow costs
(cF > cI and γF > γI), we set the remaining free parameters so as: (i) to replicate the size
of the informal sector; (ii) to get a reasonable wage premium (wF > wI); (iii) to have a faster
(more efficient) matching process informal sectors (mF (.) < mI (.)); (iv) to have more firms
in the informal sector (NF < NI) but with a lower size (hF > hI). Baseline parameters are
reported in Table 2.
5.2 Results
The result of our numerical exercise matches our targets in terms of aggregate variables, with an
unemployment rate around 12% and an informal sector representing 40% of total employment.
Wages are approximately 18% higher in the formal sector compared to the informal one, which is
roughly consistent with the lower bound of estimated wage differentials between the two sectors,
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Table 3: Main endogenous variables
Variable Sector Formal/informal Description
Formal Informal
wj 0.91 0.77 1,18 Wage
θj 0.69 2.18 0.51 Labor market tightness
nj 3.12 5.55 0.46 Number of firms
hj 0.15 0.07 2.44 Firm size
σj 6.40 11.37 0.48 Elasticity of demand for a firm
pij 0.05 0.02 3 Profits
as presented in section 2. Almost similar patterns can be found in Bargain and Kwenda (2009)
and Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) for quantile regressions.
The job finding rate is two times larger in the informal than in the formal sector, which is
larger than the differences found in section 2, but is consistent with the viewpoint taken in most
existing studies where finding a job in the informal sector is easier than in the formal one (see,
e.g. Zenou, 2008, Ulyssea, 2009).
Also consistent with the evidence, there are fewer and larger firms in the formal than in the
informal sector as argued in Rauch (1991) and discussed in Tybout (2000). More accurately,
we find formal firms to be approximately two times larger than informal ones. Correspondingly,
informal firms are approximatively two times more numerous in the informal sector. The re-
sulting price elasticity of demand is around 6 in the formal sector compared to about 11 in the
informal one. As a consequence, profits are higher in the formal sector. This also means that
the aggregate elasticity stands somewhere between those two values. Having different values for
the elasticity is a desirable feature of our model. This also means that the various externalities
stemming from market and bargaining powers are of different magnitude across sectors. Bench-
mark values are summarized in Table 3. In addition, a representation of the equilibrium is given
on Figure 13 in Appendix certifying the key IALC condition is monotonic.
5.3 Short run analysis
Competition in the formal sector The number of firms in each sector is fixed in the
short-run. We first examine the impact of a change in the number of firms in the formal sector
on the main variables of the model. With this exercice we are able to understand the effect of
an exogenous shock on relative competitiveness between the formal and informal sectors. For
each figure, we have depicted two cases: one allowing for overhiring (letting
σj−βj
σj
< 1, the
general case, represented by the continuous line) and the other ruling it out (that is, imposing
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σj−βj
σj
= 1, the dashed line). We first discuss the case with overhiring, and in the next sub-section
we compare it to the case with no overhiring.
Figure 6 about here
Figures 6 and 7 depict how the economy reacts to an exogenous variation of +/−20% of the
number of firms in the formal sector compared to the baseline case. The effect is unambiguously
(i) a fall in unemployment, though this effect is of moderate magnitude, (ii) a marked rise in
the relative size of the formal sector in total employment, though (iii) the relative size of each
firm in the formal sector tends to decrease. Finally, it can be seen that (iv) each formal firm
pays a relatively higher wage compared to the informal sector when competition in the formal
sector becomes fiercer.
Figure 7 about here
These results can be understood by looking at labor market tightnesses and prices. We
see that a rise in competition in the formal sector affects tightness in opposite ways across
sectors: tightness increases in the formal sector (θF ), while it decreases in the informal sector
(θI). Therefore, this suggests that this is mainly a result of an upward move of the IALC curve
in the (θI , θF ) space, assuming that the IALC relationship is monotonically increasing. This
results in a rise in pI and a fall in pF , so that the relative price pI/pF goes up. The increase
in informal sector relative price explains the fall in relative employment in that sector observed
in Figure 6, since LI/LF = (AF /AI) (pI/pF )
−σ, from the PME condition (31). In addition, we
see from Figure 7 that this change in relative employment corresponds to a rise in formal sector
employment LF and a fall in informal sector employment LI .
The decrease in the relative size of formal sector firms corresponds to a fall in firm size in
both sectors, as shown in Figure 7. Employment in sector j is equal to Lj = Nj × hj . In
this exercise, the number of firms is fixed in the informal sector. Hence, the fall in sectoral
employment LI translates into a fall in firm size hI . For the formal sector, total employment
LF rises, but so does the number of firms NF . The fact that firm size decreases in that sector
means that the first effect dominates the latter.
Figure 7 also shows that the change in relative wages corresponds to a rise in wages in both
sectors. This is the result of two opposite effects, since θF goes up while θI goes down. We
can therefore conclude that the rise in θF induces a rise in both wages, which dominates the
negative effect of the fall in θI .
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We can conclude that overall, if the formal sector were more similar to the informal one in
terms of the degree of competition, then aggregate employment would be slightly higher while
the informal sector would represent a significantly lower share of total employment. Wages
would increase in both sectors, with a relatively larger increase in the informal sector. Firms’
profits, however, would be negatively impacted.
The role of wage bargaining externality We now compare the cases with and without
overhiring, when there is an increase in the number of formal sector firms. It turns out that :
(i) unemployment is lower in the presence overhiring, compared to the case with no overhiring,
as expected. In relative terms, we also see from Figure 6 that the impact of overhiring is larger
in the formal sector. (ii) The relative size of the formal sector in total employment is higher,
(iii) formal firms are larger and (iv) they pay higher relative wages with overhiring compared to
without. Informal firms, on the other hand, are smaller in the presence of overhiring.
These results can be understood by comparing tightnesses and prices with and without
overhiring in the previous figures. We see that tightness is larger in the formal sector and
lower in the informal sector with overhiring. Otherwise stated, overhiring in the formal sector
(θohF ≥ θnoohF ) translates into underhiring in the informal sector (θohI ≤ θnoohI ). While the wage
bargaining externality studied in sub-section 3.4 takes place in both sectors, it leads to overhiring
in the formal sector, but to underhiring in the informal one, as a result of the interplay between
the two sectors17.
Namely, the opposite moves in θI and θF with and without overhiring suggest that the IALC
curve when overhiring should be above the same curve when overhiring takes place in the (θI , θF )
space.
As a result, the price pI is larger with than without overhiring while the converse holds for
pF , so that the price ratio pI/pF is larger, leading to a smaller relative size of the informal sector
LI/LF = (pI/pF )
−σ with than without overhiring as depicted in Figure 8. In a nutshell, the
so-called overhiring externality leads to higher aggregate employment and a lower proportion of
informal jobs in total employment.
5.4 Long run analysis
Entry costs We now study the long-run impact of a change in entry costs, in the formal sector
cF , driven by changes in product market regulation for instance, on unemployment u, the share
17Notice that this result contrasts with what would prevail if the two sectors where perfectly identical. Such
a case is studied in the appendix where we show that tightness should be larger in the two sectors with than
without overhiring.
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of informal employment LI/LF , relative firms’ size hI/hF , and relative wages wI/wF .
An increase in formal sector entry costs would decrease the number of formal sector firms in
the long-run. Hence, the long-run impacts of increasing entry costs are very similar qualitatively
to the impact of decreasing the number of firms in the formal sector studied in the previous
subsection.
Figure 8 about here
The quantitative effects are, however, not exactly the same, since an increase in entry costs
in the formal sector reduces the number of firms operating in both sectors, not only in the
formal one. As a result, price elasticities decrease for firms in both sectors. This implies that
even if the effects do not differ qualitatively between figures 6 and 8, they should be somewhat
different in quantitative terms since price elasticities are slightly different. In addition, lower
price elasticities also imply larger profits, especially in the formal sector. The impact is then
larger on the formal sector than on the informal one, as can be seen from Figure 9 that shows
that relative price elasticity σI/σF = NI/NF increases with entry costs.
Figure 9 about here
This has some noticeable consequences on the labor market. Formal employment decreases
with higher entry costs in the formal sector, while informal employment increases. Unemploy-
ment, on its turn, increases. From these results, we can conclude that unemployment increases
since the rise in informality is not sufficient to compensate the fall in formal employment.18
Finally, changes in sectoral employment also have an impact on firms’size in each sector:
Overall, it turns out that a decrease in cF , due to e.g. a reduction in product market
regulation strictness, would lead to lower unemployment and a smaller share of informal jobs
in total employment. Wages would then be higher in both sectors, with a smaller wage ratio
wI/wF . Notice that the reduction in unemployment and informality in Brazil observed over the
past decade cannot be explained by a lessening of PMR, since it was accompanied by a rise the
relative wages in the informal sector.
Bargaining power We now study the long-run impact of a change in workers bargaining
power in the formal sector βF on unemployment u, share of informal employment LI/LF , relative
firms’ size hI/hF , and relative wages wI/wF . Figures 10 and 12 display how the economy reacts
18Notice that while this is true in our numerical exercise, it is not necessarily the case for alternative numerical
configurations.
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to a (quite large) exogenous change of workers’ bargaining power in the formal sector, which
ranges from 0.35 to 0.55. The long-run impact of increasing workers’ bargaining power is a
combination of its direct impact and of its impact on the number of firms in each sector in the
long-run equilibrium, nI and nF . Higher workers’ bargaining power decreases profits, which, in
turn, should lead to a smaller number of firms. The effect is larger in the formal sector, as can
be seen from Figure 12, where the relative elasticity σI/σF = nI/nF increases.
The effect is unambiguously (i) a rise in unemployment, (ii) a rise in informal employment
relative to formal employment and (iii) a rise in the relative size of informal firms compared to
formal firms, and (iv) a decrease in relative wages wI/wF .
Figure 10 about here
These results can be understood with the analysis of the impact of βF on tightnesses and
prices as depicted on Figure 11. A rise in bargaining power βF results in a fall in tightness
for both sectors, θI and θF . This suggests a downward move of the PC curve in the (θI , θF )
space. This leads to a fall in the price in the informal sector pI . The price pF , however, increases
despite lower tightness, as a result of the rise in labor costs due to higher bargaining power of
the sector’s workers.
Figure 11 about here
In turn, the relative price pI/pF goes down, which explains the rise in LI/LF = (AF /AI) (pI/pF )
−σ
in Figure 10. Wages increase in both sectors, in spite of their fall in tightness: the rise in bar-
gaining power more than compensates the fall in tightnesses. Wages increase by a larger amount
in the formal sector, so that relative wages wI/wF decrease. Note that, as shown in Figure 10,
formal sector employment decreases when their workers have higher bargaining power. In the
informal sector, on the contrary, a higher βF would increase employment. This translates in
changes in firms’ size in each sector as follows. In the formal sector, firms size hF decreases as
a result of the fall in formal employment NFhF . The opposite is true for the informal sector:
its total employment increases NIhI , resulting in larger firms hI . Unemployment, on its turn,
always increases with βF , meaning that the rise in informal employment does not compensate
the fall in formal employment.
Figure 12 about here
Overall, it turns out that if the formal sector were more similar to the informal one in
terms of bargaining power (lower βF , due to a reduction in labor market deregulation, for
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instance), then unemployment would be lower, and the informal sector would represent a lower
share of total employment. Moreover, the wage ratio wI/wF would increase. This set of effects is
compatible with the stylized facts observed for the Brazilian economy since 2002: unemployment
and informality decrease, while informal sector relative wage increased.
6 Conclusion
Using a matching model with large firms similar in spirit to Delacroix (2006) and Ebell and Hae-
fke (2009), we have studied the impact of product and labor market regulations on equilibrium
unemployment, the size of formal and informal sectors and wages. Our model endogenously
generates a less competitive formal sector, which a common assumption taken by previous lit-
erature. In this setting, we have shown that a fall in PMR strictness (captured by a fall in
administrative barriers to entry in the formal sector) reduces the size of the informal sector and
unemployment while it raises wages. Conversely, a fall in LMR (captured by a fall in workers’
bargaining power in the formal sector) reduces both unemployment and informality while it
reduces wages. For policy purposes, this means that it is possible to reduce informality without
increasing unemployment or wages by reducing PMR instead of LMR strictness, or by reducing
both simultaneously. Notice that in this case, although wages would increase, wage inequality
would increase with the rise in the formal sector wage premium. Finally, we consider the ef-
fects of wage bargaining in both sectors, which leads to ‘overhiring’ in the formal sector. This
translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector.
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7 Technical Appendix
7.1 Wage determination
Substituting equations (17) and (20) into equation (21) we get:
(1− βj)wj − rU
r + dj
=
βj
(r + dj)(1 + τj)
[
Aj
σj − 1
σj
pj −
(
wj(hj) +
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj
)
(1 + τj)
]
or
wj = (1− βj)rU + βj
1 + τj
[
Aj
σj − 1
σj
pj − ∂wj(hj)
∂hj
hj(1 + τj)
]
or
∂wj(hj)
∂hj
+
1
βjhj
wj −
(1− βj)rU + βj σj−1σj(1+τj)pjAj
βjhj
= 0 (40)
which defines the wage wj as a solution to a differential equation of the form
∂wj
∂hj
+F (hj)wj(hj)+
G(hj) = 0, with F (hj) =
1
βjhj
and G(hj) = −
(1−βj)rU+βj σj−1σj(1+τj)pjAj
βjhj
. Equation (40) admits as a
solution
wj(hj) =
[
K −
∫ hj
0
G(ζ)
H(ζ)
dζ
]
H(hj) (41)
where H(.) solves the homogeneous equation dH/dhj +F (hj)H(hj) = 0 which can be rewritten
dH/dhj
H(hj)
= −F (hj) or hj dH/dhj
H(hj)
= −1/βj
Thus
H(hj) = h
−1/βj
j
As in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), we assume the wage wj is bounded at hj = 0, which implies
K = 0 in equation (41). wj can then be rewritten as:
wj(hj) = h
−1/βj
j
∫ hj
0
ζ1/βj−1
[
(1− βj)
βj
rU +
σj − 1
σj(1 + τj)
pj(ζ)Aj
]
dζ
= (1− βj)rU + βj σj − 1
σj(1 + τj)
h
−1/βj
j Aj
∫ hj
0
ζ1/βj−1pj(ζ)dζ
Integrating by parts and using the fact that dpj/dζ = −pj/σjζ according to equation (3), so
that
∫ lj
0 ζ
1/βj−1pj(ζ)dζ =
σjβj
σj−βj h
1/βj
j pj(hj). This leads to equation (23):
wj(hj) = (1− βj)rU + βj σj − 1
σj − βj
Ajpj(hj)
(1 + τj)
.
7.2 Summary of equilibrium relationships
7.2.1 Short-run equilibrium
A short-run equilibrium is defined as a tuple (rU∗, p∗j , w
∗
j , L
∗
j , u
∗, θ∗j , v
∗
j , h
∗
j , C
∗
j , Y
∗), with j = I, F,
for a given value of Nj for each industry.
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Workers’ Reservation wage.
rU∗ = z +
∑
j=F,I
1
1 + τj
βj
1− βj
γjθ
∗
j
1− δj (42)
Prices.
p∗j ≡ pj
(
θ∗j , θ
∗
k
)
=
σj − βj
σj − 1
1
Aj
(1 + τj) z + 1 + τj
1 + τk
βk
1− βk
γkθ
∗
k
1− δk +
r + dj + βjθ
∗
jmj (θj)
(1− βj) (1− δj)
γj
mj
(
θ∗j
)

(43)
Wages.
w∗j ≡ wj
(
θ∗j , θ
∗
k
)
= z +
βj
1− βj
γj
(
r + dj + θ
∗
jmj
(
θ∗j
))
(1− xj)mj
(
θ∗j
)
(1 + τj)
+
1
1 + τk
βk
1− βk
γkθ
∗
k
1− δk (44)
for j ∈ {I, F} and k 6= j. Aggregate Price Index.
P ∗ = 1 =
[
αp∗I
1−σ + αp∗F
1−σ]1/(1−σ)
labor Market Flow Equilibrium.
L∗j =
[
1 +
dj
θ∗jm(θ
∗
j )
+
dj
dk
θ∗kmk(θ
∗
k)
θ∗jmj(θ
∗
j )
]−1
, for j = F, I, (45)
u∗ = 1− L∗F − L∗I (46)
v∗j = θ
∗
ju
∗ (47)
Firms’ size.
h∗j = L
∗
j/Nj ≡ hj(θ∗j , θ∗k) (48)
where j ∈ {I, F} and k 6= j, and where Nj can be treated as a parameter in the short run, and
will be endogenized in the longer run. Product Market equilibrium.
C∗j = (p
∗
j )
−σαY ∗ = AjL∗j (49)
Aggregate Income.
Y ∗ =
∑
j=I,F
Ajpj
(
θ∗j , θ
∗
k
)
Lj
(
θ∗j , θ
∗
k
)
. (50)
7.2.2 Long-run equilibrium
The next step is to determine the equilibrium number of firms in each industry. We have :
Sectoral elasticities.
σ∗j = σN
∗
j
Free entry.
cj +
γjh
∗
j
mj(θ∗j )
=
1 + r
r + δj
pi∗j (51)
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Firms’ profits.
pi∗j = p
∗
jAjh
∗
j − w∗jh∗j (1 + τj)− γjv∗j (52)
= p∗jAjh
∗
j − w∗jh∗j (1 + τj)− γjsjh∗j/mj(θ∗j )
7.3 A particular case: identical sectors
It makes sense to determine how the economy would behave in the absence of differences between
the formal and the informal sector, that is, if there were only one sector in the economy. This
symmetric case can serve as a reference point to be compared to the case studied in our paper,
where there are two different sector.
In the symmetric case, we have p∗j = p
∗
k = 1, θ
∗
j = θ
∗
k = θ
∗ and L∗j = L
∗
k = L
∗, which
makes the model particularly simple to study. From equation (29), labor market tightness θ∗ is
implicitly defined by:
A =
σN − β
σN − 1
[
(1 + τ)z +
β
1− β
γθ∗
1− δ +
1
1− β
r + d+ βθ∗m(θ∗)
1− δ
γ
m(θ∗)
]
. (53)
By applying the implicit function theorem to equation (53) we carry out a number of comparative
statics which are described below.
Effect of a rise in competition N on wages, tightness and (un)employment. From
equation (53), the short-run impact of increasing competition is unambiguously a rise in θ∗. In
turn, this implies a rise in employment L∗ = 2θ
∗m(θ∗)
2θ∗m(θ∗)+d and a decrease in unemploymentu
∗ =
d
2θ∗m(θ∗)+d . However, this is the result of two opposite effects, as the term
σN−β
σN−1 in equation
(53) can itself be decomposed in two terms: (i) Nreduces the markup factor σNσN−1 while (ii) it
increases the overhiring factor σN−βσN . According to (i), more competition leads to lower markup,
higher output and lower unemployment. According to (ii), overhiring is positively related to
market power. A rise in N thus reduces incentives to overhire, and thus tends to increase wages,
which is detrimental to employment. It is straightforward to show that the former effect always
dominates the latter so that employment increases when market power decreases.
Effect of a rise in workers’ bargaining power β. The short-run impact of raising workers’
bargaining power β on tightness is a priori ambiguous. This is the result of two opposite effects:
(i) a rise in β translates into higher labor costs (the term in brackets in equation (53)) which
reduces tightness θ∗. However, (ii) a rise in β increases firms incentives to overhire, which
counteracts (i). It is possible to show that ∂θ/∂β><0 whenever
σ
<
>
(1 + τ)z + 11−β
r+d+2βθ∗m(θ∗)
1−δ
γ
m(θ∗) + β
r+d+2θ∗m(θ∗)
(1−δ)(1−β)2
γ
m(θ∗)
r+d+2θ∗m(θ∗)
(1−δ)(1−β)2
γ
m(θ∗)
For low levels of σ (low competition), a rise in β raises firms’ incentives to overhire. As a result,
θ∗ and L∗ should increase. For larger levels of σ, a rise in workers’ bargaining power β raises
labor costs and this leads to a fall in θ∗ and L∗.
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Effect of a rise in τ, z, γ. The short-run impact of a rise in τ, z and γ is lower tightness and
lower employment. From (53), those three parameters increase wage or search costs for firms,
which leads to a fall in tightness and employment. On the contrary, the short run impact of a
rise in productivity is higher tightness and higher employment.
Effect of the overhiring factor σN−βσN . In the absence of bargaining externalities, the overhir-
ing factor σN−βσN in equation (53) would be equal to one, and the resulting equilibrium tightness
θnoovh would solve :
A =
σN
σN − 1
[
(1 + τ)z +
β
1− β
γθnoovh
1− δ +
1
1− β
r + d+ βθnoovhm(θnoovh)
1− δ
γ
m(θnoovh)
]
(54)
A comparison of (54) and (53) implies that θ∗ ≥ θnoovh. This also implies that w(θ∗) ≥
w(θnoovh), and that L
∗ ≥ Lnoovh. That is, tightness, wages and employment are higher in the
presence of the overhiring externality.
7.4 Uniqueness of equilibrium
Step 1. Properties of the price functions (43).
pj =
σj − βj
σj − 1
1
Aj
[
(1 + τj)z +
1 + τj
1 + τk
βk
1− βk
γkθk
1− δk +
1
1− βj
r + dj + βjθjmj(θ)
1− δj
γj
mj(θj)
]
(55)
From the implicit function theorem, we get that pj is increasing in θj and θk.
Step 2. Properties of the Product Market Equilibrium condition (PME).
Combining (49) and (43) we get
LI
LF
=
AF
AI
[
pI(θI , θF )
pF (θI , θF )
]−σ
(56)
The properties of the PME curve then results from the implicit function theorem. Differentiating
(56) we get that the ratio LILF increases with θI if the following condition on price elasticities is
fulfilled:
θI
∂pF /∂θI
pF
≥ θI ∂pI/∂θI
pI
. (57)
Similarly, the ratio LILF decreases with θF if the following condition on price elasticities holds:
θF
∂pF /∂θF
pF
≤ θF ∂pI/∂θF
pI
(58)
If these two conditions are not fulfilled, then the PME curve is not necessarily monotonic in the
(θF,θI) space. Nevertheless, our simulations indicate that this is the case.
Step 3. Properties of the labor Market Flow Equilibrium condition (LME).
36
LI
LF
=
dF
dI
θImI(θI)
θFmF (θF )
(59)
The RHS of (59) is decreasing in θF and increasing in θI . Therefore, the (LME) curve is upward
sloping in the (θF,θI) space.
Step 4. Properties of the IAL curve.
Using LME and PME, we get the following IAL relationship:
dF
dI
θImI(θI)
θFmF (θF )
=
AF
AI
[
pI(θI , θF )
pF (θI , θF )
]−σ
(60)
which implicitly defines θI as a function of θF . From step 2, we know that the LHS of equation
(60) is not necessarily monotonic. Here, again, our simulations indicate that this is the case.
Step 5. Properties of the PC curve.
Using (29), the definition of the aggregate price index, P ∗ = α1/(1−σ)
[
pI(θI , θF )
1−σ + pF (θI , θF )1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
,
and the normalization P ∗ = 1, the PC relationship can be written :
1− αpI(θI , θF )1−σ = αpF (θI , θF )1−σ. (61)
Given the properties of prices studied in step 1, this equation implicitly defines a decreasing
relationship between θI and θF .
Step 6. Properties of the equilibrium.
An equilibrium is the pair (θ∗I , θ
∗
F ) at the intersection of the IAL and PC curves studied in steps
(4) and (5). The figure below illustrates the benchmark where an upward sloped IAL curve and
an downward sloped PC establish the equilibrium.
Figure 13 about here
Comparative statics properties of the equilibrium result from shifts of these curve, and they are
studied numerically.
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Figure 6: The short-run impact of varying competition
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
w
I
nF
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
w
F
nF
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
0.073
0.074
0.075
0.076
0.077
h I
nF
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
0.14
0.16
0.18
h F
nF
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
0.41
0.42
0.43
L I
nF
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
0.45
0.46
0.47
L F
nF
Figure 7: The short-run impact of varying competition (cont’d)
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Figure 8: The long-run impact of varying barriers to entry in the formal sector
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Figure 9: The long-run impact of varying barriers to entry in the formal sector (cont’d)
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Figure 10: The long-run impact of varying bargaining power in the formal sector
0.4 0.45 0.5
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
θ I
βF
 
 
Overhiring
No overhiring
0.4 0.45 0.5
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
θ F
βF
 
 
Overhiring
No overhiring
0.4 0.45 0.5
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
p I
βF
 
 
Overhiring
No overhiring
0.4 0.45 0.5
0.825
0.83
0.835
0.84
0.845
0.85
p F
βF
 
 
Overhiring
No overhiring
Figure 11: The long-run impact of varying bargaining power in the formal sector (cont’d)
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Figure 12: The long-run impact of varying bargaining power in the formal sector (cont’d)
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Figure 13: Equilibrium in the benchmark case
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